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Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law. By
ROBERT C. PosT, et a!. [Durham, North Carolina: Duke University
Press. 2001. 169, (Bibliography) I and (Index) 3 pp. Paperback £14.50.
ISBN 0--8223-2713-9.]
THIS is a small volume with large ambition. The centrepiece is an argument
by a prominent legal academic (Robert C. Post) on how and why to reconceptualise American anti-discrimination law. His proposal is commented
on by four equally august scholars drawn from departments as diverse as
African-American studies and philosophy (K. Anthony Appiah), rhetoric
and comparative literature (Judith Butler), and law (Thomas C. Grey and
Reva B. Siegel, respectively), with Post given a final rejoinder. The complex
and thoughtful contributions in this volume provide a welcome addition to
the growing discipline examining the intersection of legal doctrine and
visual culture, of which the most prominent branch is perhaps that of
critical race theory.
Post's essay ("Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American
Antidiscrimination Law") begins with the claim that the rationale
underlying current anti-discrimination Jaw compels the judiciary to
formulate remedies that "liberate individuals from the thrall" of socially
held stereotypes, when in reality Jaw itself can do no more than "reshape
the nature and content" of those conventions ( p. I). According to Post,
anti-discrimination
proviSions
are
geared
towards
ameliorating
disadvantages that individuals incur when their appearances are associated
with inaccurate judgments about their capabilities and moral worth. While
disassociation may seem like a laudable goal, wholly diverging personal
visible identity from appearance engenders difficulties because the two
concepts are linked. Moreover, a legal regime that vitiates their connection
for the sake of upholding people's dignity or worth (as an example,
through application of "colour blind" policies) is invariably overreaching.
As an alternative, Post advocates for an anti-discrimination theory that
would acknowledge its true goal as seeking to change those practices
underlying undesirable social convention. Doing so requires society to resist
the "dominant perspective" that imagines law "as standing in a neutral
space outside of history", and to instead "recognise how law functions to
embody itself in history" (pp. 39, 41).
Appiah ("Stereotypes and the Shaping of Identity") notes that
stereotypes have various manifestations, including statistical, false, and
normative ones. Further, accepting Post's sociological understanding of
stereotypes as contributing to the formation of personal identity raises
concerns that stereotypes will not only facilitate third parties in excluding
certain people, but also act as a disincentive for those individuals to invest
in themselves. Because Appiah perceives anti-discrimination Jaw as
encompassing ideals of autonomy, dignity, and individualism, he suggests
that it focus on the question of "what makes two people or two kinds of
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people morally alike" for the purpose of understanding equality theory
( p. 57).
Adding to the critique of Post's conception of stereotypes, Butler
("Appearances Aside") takes issue with the idea of personal identity
expressed through stereotype as being either static or controlling. Butler
argues, instead, that an individual can have several personal identities,
depending on changing social circumstances, and that each of these selves
can contribute to an overall self-identity. Hence, she maintains that law
should not endorse social conventions that define and fix personhood.
Grey's essay ("Cover Blindness") locates Post's thesis within "the
conventional landscape of American civil rights history, theory, and
doctrine" ( p. 87). He observes that the first wave of anti-discrimination
was directed at overt exclusions based on personal identity characteristics,
such as race-based restrictions. By contrast, contemporary civil rights law
requires "deliberate strategic intervention into social life" (p. 89). As an
instrumentality of change, Grey asserts that law must always be understood
contextually as a mechanism that "reinterprets and often redirects the force
of the social impulses that drive its content" (95-96).
Modelling her perspective on anti-discrimination law from a sociohistorical perspective, Siegel ("Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How
'Color
Blindness'
Discourse
Disrupts
and
Rationalises
Social
Stratification") focusses on social stratification, a concept that is absent
from Post's essay. Believing that this notion must be understood if any
sense is to be made of anti-discrimination law's central trope of identityblindness, Siegel provides a detailed account of how social stratification
among groups is a result of "the interaction of social structure and social
meaning" (p. 100). Next, her essay describes how legal discourse on colour
blindness can either diminish or reinforce social stratification, depending on
the time and sociohistorical context of the dialogue.
In the concluding section, Post ("Response to Commentators")
reiterates several of his earlier assertions, including the motivating
aspiration of analysing anti-discrimination law from an external,
sociological, perspective that would reveal how that area of jurisprudence
"actually functions" (p. 160).
Providing some astute and interesting insights into anti-discrimination
law, Prejudicial Appearances is a brief but illuminating invitation to further
explore the ways in which individuals are treated because of their
appearance, as well as what law can, and possibly should, do to counteract
those effects. If the book has a failing it is in its scope. There are many
personal identity characteristics that need not be related to readily
discernable characteristics, homosexuality and mental disability to name
but two examples, that also subject individuals to unequal treatment
M.A.
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